Problems of Hedge Funds

Hedge funds deal in a paradoxical private language worthy of the worlds of Lewis Carroll or George Orwell. Words seem to be able to mean whatever managers want them to mean: market-neutral positions can bankrupt a fund; long-term capital means a small amount of short-term capital leveraged to the hilt; and to hedge means to take wildly risky positions. Sometimes, even the investors do not know what strategies their funds are using. The rules of LTCM, for example, forbade investors asking what it was that gave the fund its promised edge, ostensibly because of fears of secret investment strategies leaking to competitors.

What is more, it is often not clear if, when hedge funds perform spectacularly well, their high returns owe more to investment judgment, to leverage or to the chance outcomes of purely speculative bets. After all, when a bet is risky, it will make a lot of money if the outcome is as hoped; but when it is relatively safe, the profit is meager unless the bet is big.

Hedge funds claim to be arbitrageurs rather than speculators. But it is generally agreed that there are relatively few real arbitrage opportunities even LTCM returned money to investors in early 1998 claiming lack of opportunities so when you find them, you have to bet big. And when the bets go wrong, you need enough capital or credit lines to stay at the table. Of course, the richer and more powerful a fund becomes, the greater its ability to influence the market in which it deals, often leading to self-fulfilling prophecies. As has been pointed out about Soros, it is not that difficult to move markets when you back your bet with $2 billion and can ride roughshod over markets and governments.

Indeed, hedge funds offer potentially high returns for the lucky few but considerable dangers when their heavy borrowing can damage a whole financial system, and their trading strategies can destabilize whole countries and markets that are not equipped to cope with mass selling of their currencies and equity markets. There is some dispute about the real impact of hedge funds but it seems indisputable that they are powerful and dominant in many markets, including emerging markets, high-yielding debt and mortgage derivatives. And the LTCM bailout suggests that there were real fears that its collapse and the fire sale of its positions would send the global markets into a tailspin. Soros himself provides this counterpoint to some degree in his 1998 book, where he argues that markets have grown so large and powerful they can destroy countries; and markets have become so frightened that they will withdraw capital from most countries in the world. He calls for more international regulation of markets, perhaps through an international central bank or an agency to guarantee loans a cry from the heart that MIT economics professor Paul Krugman has amusingly if harshly translated as "stop me before I speculate again."

In a different article, this one carried by Slate magazine, Krugman discusses LTCM and the possibility that hedge fund compensation arrangements create the incentives to take inordinate risks since managers share in the upside but not the downside. He points out that if someone lends you a trillion, they have effectively given you a put option on whatever you buy: since you can always declare bankruptcy and walk away, it is as if you owned the right to sell those assets at a fixed price whatever happens to the market. He argues that the rational way to maximize the value of the options is to invest in the riskiest, most volatile assets since if you win, you win massively, and if you lose, you merely get some bad press and lose the money you yourself put in.

George Soros and Hedge Funds

A number of energetic people fled from behind the Iron Curtain in the years after World War II. One, George Soros, carried with him a European's sense of philosophy that he applied to understanding markets. Although not trained as an economist or accountant perhaps because of this gap Soros took a psychological and cultural approach to predicting markets. Through his flagship fund, the Quantum Fund, registered outside the United States for flexibility, he would take major positions for or against foreign exchange, derivatives, emerging markets, bonds, private markets or almost anything. Any market was fair game for his group. And he would use leverage to amplify his wagers when called for. Results were outstanding although the volatility was not for the faint.

More recently, he has been writing about his investment style. Coverage in news reverses his trading desk mentality never to discuss his trading positions. And his model book on reflexivity, The Alchemy of Finance, explains his investment approach, which factors investment expectation into structure to make things that seem obvious actually occur. Indeed, the Quantum Fund's name is a reference to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which describes our inability to predict the behavior of sub-atomic particles.

But Soros's main skill is as a guerrilla investor willing to explore any market, study it more than others, strike with style and quietly withdraw, most often with a profit. In 1992, he became known as "the man who broke the Bank of England" after his attack on sterling forced its exit from the European Union's fixed exchange rate system and reputedly netted the Quantum Fund $1 billion in a day.

George Soros is a complete person and public figure, described variously as hard-nosed financier, philosopher-king, and latter-day Robin Hood. The activities of his charities are well-covered and substantial, especially in the former Soviet sphere, where his Soros Foundation has been more generous than all but two other entities, both of which are big countries. He claims that over half his time now is spent giving money away. So his life is making the transition to that which could be called a private statesman.

Nevertheless, in 1998, Soros suffered some serious setbacks. Not only was his new book on global capitalism poorly received and the Quantum Fund forced into restructuring, but his August letter to the Financial Times on the economic chaos in Russia seemed to trigger the country's debt default and currency devaluation. As the Moscow Times noted, Soros issued what was perhaps the most humiliating statement of his career: "The turmoil in Russian financial markets is not due to anything I said or did. We have no intention of shorting the currency. In fact our portfolio would be hurt by any devaluation." But it was too late: the theory of reflexivity played a cruel joke on its creator and on the ruble.

Understanding Hedge Funds

Highwaymen of the global economy was Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad's description of hedge funds after the devastation of his country's currency and stock market in 19978, which he blamed on them, particularly the fund led by George Soros. The near-collapse and $3.6 billion bailout of John Meriwether's Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) by fourteen Wall Street banks and brokerage houses in the late summer of 1998 did little to restore the reputation of these shadowy investment vehicles. What are they all about?

Hedge funds typically pool the capital of no more than a hundred high net worth individuals or institutions under the direction of a single manager or small team. Their name originally comes from the fact that unlike most institutional investors, they were able to deal in derivatives and short selling in theory to protect or ''hedge" their positions. But having begun as a way of minimizing risk, the conservative activity of hedging has become the least important of their pursuits.

Usually based in offshore tax havens like the Cayman Islands to escape the regulators and the standard reporting requirements of mutual funds, hedge funds use their freedom to borrow aggressively, to sell short, to leverage up to 20 times their paid-in capital (though LTCM had somehow borrowed over 50 times its capital base) and generally to make big but highly risky bets. They tend to focus on absolute rather than relative returns, aiming simply to make money rather than to beat an index.

But the only real difference between hedge funds and other funds are their compensation strategies. Hedge fund managers tend to be paid for performance, with a modest management fee but a substantial share of the profits the fund makes typically 15-20% though LTCM charged 25%. Otherwise, hedge funds are a diverse grouping of independent asset managers pursuing a variety of investment strategies, usually with minimal disclosure to investors and regulators, and most operating in a niche where they feel they understand the "rules of the game" better than anyone else. Consultancy Financial Risk Management categorizes them into four main groups in a comprehensive overview of the hedge fund market produced with investment bank Goldman Sachs.

First, there are the macro-funds of which Soros's fund is a leading example. These indulge in tactical trading, one-way speculation on the future direction of currencies, commodities, equities, bonds, derivatives or other assets. Their most-publicized activities involve speculation on exchange rate movements, usually shorting the currencies of countries whose economic policies look questionable and whose ability to maintain an exchange rate peg is weak (see Short Selling). Macro-funds constitute the most volatile hedge fund sector in performance terms and their correlation with traditional bench-marks is low.

Second, there are the market-neutral or relative value funds, the kind of fund LTCM described itself as. These funds are supposedly low risk because they do not depend on the direction of market movements. Instead, they try to exploit transitory pricing anomalies, regardless of whether markets rise or fall, through an arbitrage technique called convergence trading: spotting apparently unjustified differences in prices of assets with similar risks and betting that the prices will revert to their normal relationship. For example, LTCM was betting that historically wide spreads between emerging market and US assets and between corporate bonds and US Treasuries would narrow. Of course, as it turned out, history proved no guide to the future as spreads widened and everything moved in the wrong direction at once.

Third, there are event-driven funds, which invest in the arbitrage opportunities created by actual or anticipated corporate events, such as mergers, reorganizations, share buybacks and bankruptcies. Merger arbitrage, for example, involves trading in the stocks of both bidder and target on the assumption that their prices will converge if the deal goes ahead.

Lastly, there are long-short strategy funds, which combine equities and/or bonds in long and short positions to reduce market exposure and isolate the performance of the fund from the asset class as a whole.

Given the lack of a strict definition of hedge funds and the fact that they file no reports, it is difficult to estimate the extent of their activity. Figures for 1998 from the Hedge Fund Association suggest there are between 4000 and 5000 funds with total assets in excess of $250 billion; while according to TASS, a performance measurement firm, there are only 3000 funds but with over $300 billion in assets. But as the experience of LTCM shows, the total assets may not be a true representation of the amount of money dedicated to short-term trading activity since the funds frequently borrow substantially in order to make leveraged bets.

Future of Growth Investing

The epitome of growth investing was the one-decision stock era of the bull market of the early 1970s. The notion was that growth of earnings per share could be projected as a straight line on semi-log paper for the most durable, well managed companies. Predictable growth would be valued richly by investors, which would make equity capital cheaper and easier to raise. In turn, this equity could be invested at higher than average rates of return on capital, which cycled into more earnings per share. And so the money machine would turn. The proper investment strategy was to buy the right companies and hold them forever.

The index funds of the late 1990s get some of the same influence although not by overtly selecting highly regarded stocks (see Indexing and Mutual Funds). But the index tends to be more heavily weighted in those stocks. The one-decision phenomenon of the 1970s and the indexing craze of the 1990s may end up at the same place: ownership of a handful of richly valued companies whose history is not a precursor of their future. And the indexer, like the one-decision investor, is disciplined to stay invested no matter what.Jeremy Grantham of Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co. LLC comments:

Historically, at the stock levels in the United States, equity investors have over-paid for comfort (stability, information, size, consensus, market domination, brand names). Historically, equity investors have over-paid for excitement and sex appeal (growth, profitability, management skills, technological change, cyclicality, volatility, and most of all, acceleration in the above).

Paying-up for comfort and excitement as growth managers do for example, is not necessarily foolish, for clients also like these characteristics. Conversely, when a value manager is very wrong as he will be sooner or later he will be fired more quickly than a growth manager. To add insult to injury, the data indicates that the best growth managers add more to growth than the best value managers can add to value, probably because the fundamentals and the prices are more dynamic for growth stocks.

Finally, beyond the financial details of potential growth companies and growth stocks, what are the broad requirements of a successful business? And conversely, what are the features of business failure? We suggest three characteristics which, if found together, will guarantee success for failure. If a business has a combination of passion, authenticity and integrity, it will succeed. In contrast, whenever you find together the three ingredients of mediocrity, arrogance and isolation, the business or indeed the country concerned will fail.

Critics on Peter Lynch

Why not? Of course, the purpose of equity investing is growth, is it not? So the two words seem to be inseparably linked. But perhaps we confuse growth with appreciation. And perhaps we automatically associate past growth with future appreciation. They can differ.

Marc Faber, our guru for Manias, Panics and Crashes, points out, there are two reasons why highly popular stocks, which have become viewed as growth stocks, usually end up as costly disappointments:
First, exciting new markets often fail to keep growing as rapidly and profitably as expected. Second, when a business achieves great success, competitors are attracted into the field, slowing growth and shrinking profit margins for the early leaders. Gottaown stocks are very likely to be losers.

Certainly, when growth stocks start to decelerate, when momentum ends, the price of failure is high. Once a growth stock starts to fall, it loses its momentum attractions, followers of the trend start to desert, forcing the price down further and creating a downward spiral. In such circumstances, there can be high penalties for earnings disappointments. Eventually, growth stocks fail to fulfill their original promise and disappoint investors. Then, as fallen angels they become potential seeds for future value stocks.

Some growth industries never produce any growth stocks: competition is so fierce that no one makes any money. And in a classic article published in the Harvard Business Review over 40 years ago, Peter Bernstein (see Economic Forecasting), makes the important distinction between growth stocks and growth companies:

Growth stocks are a happy and haphazard category of investments which, curiously enough, have little or nothing to do with growth companies. Indeed, the term growth stock is meaningless; a growth stock can only be identified with hindsight it is simply a stock which went way up. But the concept of growth company can be used to identify the most creative, most imaginative management groups; and if, in addition, their stocks are valued at a reasonable ratio to their increase in earnings power over time, the odds are favorable for appreciation in the future.

While Peter Lynch likes growth companies, out of self-professed lack of understanding, he has tended to avoid the high-tech area, where many of the biggest individual growth stock gains of the 1990s have been made (see Internet Investing). His style is also limited to investing in US equities. Of course, it is true that the concept of investment in growth companies as a distinct style of equity investing seems to emerge only in maturing economies. Growth is assumed to be an integral element of any stock selection criteria in many other parts of the world

Peter Lynch, Growth Investing Expert

Peter Lynch is one of the best-known names in investing. He ran Fidelity's Magellan Fund for thirteen years from 1977 and in that period, Magellan was up over 2700%. Lynch managed a vast portfolio, containing over fourteen thousand stocks at any time, and turned over the whole portfolio on average once a year. Yet even in difficult markets, he was almost always opposed to assets sitting in bonds and cash. Instead, he advocated holding good quality stocks with low volatility when going defensive.

Lynch's basic message is that an individual investor can actually find great stocks before Wall Street does: using a combination of intelligence, reflection, perseverance and discipline, it is possible for the average person to uncover great investments. His central point is that products and services you use and enjoy are often provided by excellent companies. If you research these companies and find out whether or not the stock that corresponds to them is priced favorably, you have an outstanding chance at compounding market-beating returns industries and businesses; investigating how a company treats its customers and vice versa. This is the only way I know to find great companies, and nothing beats the feeling when it pays off.

While a fund manager is more or less forced into owning a long list of stocks, an individual has the luxury of owning just a few. That means you can afford to be choosy and invest only in outfits that you understand and that have a superior product or franchise with clear opportunities for expansion. You can wait until the company repeats its successful formula in several places or markets (same-store sales on the rise, earnings on the rise) before you buy the first share.

If you put together a portfolio of five to ten of these high achievers, there's a decent chance one of them will turn out to be a ten-, a twenty- or even a fifty-bagger, where you can make ten, twenty or fifty times your investment. With your stake divided among a handful of issues, all it takes is a couple of gains of this magnitude in a lifetime to produce superior returns.

So what advice does Lynch give to the typical individual investor? Writing in his regular column in Worth magazine, he recommends:

Find your edge and put it to work by adhering to the following rules:

With every stock you own, keep track of its story in a logbook. Note any new developments and pay close attention to earnings. Is this a growth play, a cyclical play or a value play? Stocks do well for a reason and do poorly for a reason. Make sure you know the reasons.

Pay attention to facts, not forecasts.

Ask yourself: what will I make if I'm right, and what could I lose if I'm wrong? Look for a risk-reward ratio of three to one or better.

Before you invest, check the balance sheet to see if the company is financially sound.


Don't buy options, and don't invest on margin. With options, time works against you, and if you're on margin, a drop in the market can wipe you out.

When several insiders are buying the company's stock at the same time, it's a positive.

Average investors should be able to monitor five to ten companies at a time, but nobody is forcing you to own any of them. If you like seven, buy seven. If you like three, buy three. If you like zero, buy zero.

Be patient. The stocks that have been most rewarding to me have made their greatest gains in the third or fourth year I owned them. A few took ten years.

Enter early but not too early. I often think of investing in growth companies in terms of baseball. Try to join the game in the third inning, because a company has proved itself by then. If you buy before the line-up is announced, you're taking an unnecessary risk. There's plenty of time (ten to fifteen years in some cases) between the third and the seventh innings, which is where the ten- to fifty-baggers are made. If you buy in the late innings, you may be too late.

Don't buy cheap stocks just because they're cheap. Buy them because the fundamentals are improving.

Buy small companies after they've had a chance to prove they can make a profit.

Long-shots usually backfire or become no shots.

If you buy a stock for the dividend, make sure the company can comfortably afford to pay the dividend out of its earnings, even in an economic slump.

Investigate ten companies and you're likely to find one with bright prospects that aren't reflected in the price. Investigate fifty and you're likely to find five.

What Is Growth Investing?

Growth investing is one of the two classical styles of investment. There are numerous different definitions of the style and some confusion about the precise relationship between growth companies and growth stocks. But a focus on growth is generally contrasted with value investing, which tends to rely more on quantitative methods of analysis. Growth investing tends to be based more on qualitative judgments about the kind of companies that will offer remarkable growth rates and exceptional returns performance.

Growth stock investing arose as a definable concept in the United States of the 1930s the counterpoint to the safe, secure income investing of the depression years. It was presumed that companies with a past record of growth in revenues and earnings had the momentum to carry them into the future. And they had to go farther into the future or at greater rates of growth than the market had already accorded in its discounting through current prices. T Rowe Price, who first set out the principles of growth stock valuation in the 1930s, wrote:

Growth stocks can be defined as shares in business enterprise that have demonstrated favorable underlying long-term growth in earnings and that, after careful research study, give indications of continued secular growth in the future.

In order to turn a capital commitment into appreciation, the growth investor needs prescience about earnings or rate of growth or the market's willingness to pay for future events. At certain times in the market for example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s and, more recently, in the late 1990s the growth investor has been rewarded with handsome returns. Those returns have in part been the result of an increase in the number of growth investors rather than a change in the valuation systems used by an existing population of investors.

And the agreement runs backwards in that those equities that have appreciated are assumed to have growth characteristics. Almost any list of the best managed companies a popular and recurring article in business publications will be composed of those stocks that have had an unusually favorable price performance for some past period. Growth stocks may see the future through the rear view mirror.