Problems of Hedge Funds

Hedge funds deal in a paradoxical private language worthy of the worlds of Lewis Carroll or George Orwell. Words seem to be able to mean whatever managers want them to mean: market-neutral positions can bankrupt a fund; long-term capital means a small amount of short-term capital leveraged to the hilt; and to hedge means to take wildly risky positions. Sometimes, even the investors do not know what strategies their funds are using. The rules of LTCM, for example, forbade investors asking what it was that gave the fund its promised edge, ostensibly because of fears of secret investment strategies leaking to competitors.

What is more, it is often not clear if, when hedge funds perform spectacularly well, their high returns owe more to investment judgment, to leverage or to the chance outcomes of purely speculative bets. After all, when a bet is risky, it will make a lot of money if the outcome is as hoped; but when it is relatively safe, the profit is meager unless the bet is big.

Hedge funds claim to be arbitrageurs rather than speculators. But it is generally agreed that there are relatively few real arbitrage opportunities even LTCM returned money to investors in early 1998 claiming lack of opportunities so when you find them, you have to bet big. And when the bets go wrong, you need enough capital or credit lines to stay at the table. Of course, the richer and more powerful a fund becomes, the greater its ability to influence the market in which it deals, often leading to self-fulfilling prophecies. As has been pointed out about Soros, it is not that difficult to move markets when you back your bet with $2 billion and can ride roughshod over markets and governments.

Indeed, hedge funds offer potentially high returns for the lucky few but considerable dangers when their heavy borrowing can damage a whole financial system, and their trading strategies can destabilize whole countries and markets that are not equipped to cope with mass selling of their currencies and equity markets. There is some dispute about the real impact of hedge funds but it seems indisputable that they are powerful and dominant in many markets, including emerging markets, high-yielding debt and mortgage derivatives. And the LTCM bailout suggests that there were real fears that its collapse and the fire sale of its positions would send the global markets into a tailspin. Soros himself provides this counterpoint to some degree in his 1998 book, where he argues that markets have grown so large and powerful they can destroy countries; and markets have become so frightened that they will withdraw capital from most countries in the world. He calls for more international regulation of markets, perhaps through an international central bank or an agency to guarantee loans a cry from the heart that MIT economics professor Paul Krugman has amusingly if harshly translated as "stop me before I speculate again."

In a different article, this one carried by Slate magazine, Krugman discusses LTCM and the possibility that hedge fund compensation arrangements create the incentives to take inordinate risks since managers share in the upside but not the downside. He points out that if someone lends you a trillion, they have effectively given you a put option on whatever you buy: since you can always declare bankruptcy and walk away, it is as if you owned the right to sell those assets at a fixed price whatever happens to the market. He argues that the rational way to maximize the value of the options is to invest in the riskiest, most volatile assets since if you win, you win massively, and if you lose, you merely get some bad press and lose the money you yourself put in.