Critics on Gary Brinson' Theory

If global investing is superior to investing in only one market, why do so many investors hold disproportionate amounts of their portfolios in equities of their own domestic markets? Even sophisticated institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, tend to concentrate well over three-quarters of their equity funds in domestically quoted shares, a phenomenon known as home bias. Evidence of wide discrepancies between national market performances over certain periods of time suggests that these investors would maximize their returns and minimize their risks more effectively by diversifying more fully across stocks in different countries.

Various explanations for home bias have been advanced. These include IMF officials' arguments that it is, in large part, due to the substantial risks of adverse exchange rate changes, which cannot be guarded against with standard hedging techniques. Currency risks may be compounded by the different supervisory environments in particular markets, by fears that capital controls may be instituted, by taxes on international trading or simply by a wish to avoid the time and expense of maintaining and researching a more widely spread international portfolio.

Such reasoning is supported by arguments that the benefits of international diversification arise merely from the fact that different stock markets have their shares concentrated in different industries. For example, the UK privatization program of the 1980s means that utilities are a more important part of the London market than elsewhere. Similarly, investment in the Swiss market implies a disproportionate bet on banking stocks, and investment in the Swedish market a commitment to basic industries. The implication is that global investing offers nothing more than exposure to additional industries.

Yet home bias on the part of institutional investors seems to be more a result of government restrictions on the amount of foreign assets pension funds and insurance companies in any given country are allowed to hold. It also may arise from the way in which fund managers' performance is assessed through reference to a local market index: even if passive indexing is not their dominant strategy, there is inevitably a strong incentive to own a good slice of the index's components. And industry analysts are often more prevalent than country analysts in fund managers' offices, suggesting a disposition to choose industrial over international diversification.

There is evidence that the covariances of global markets may be sliding closer, though Japan may be a special case. For the other members of the G-7, coordinated banking policies and facilitated information flows should tend to drive markets into a more steady alignment. On the surface, such an increase in stability could be seen as beneficial for business but would be a lessened benefit for portfolio investors attempting to diversify risk.

For example, closer links between European economies following the introduction of the euro will increase the incentive for US investors to diversify into European markets. At the same time, this may also strengthen the relationship between different European stock markets, reducing the incentive for diversification within Europe.

Gary Brinson an Expert on Global Investing

Gary Brinson is a staunch advocate of asset allocation techniques and a pioneer of global investing. In 1974, the firm now known as Brinson Partners (then a unit of First Chicago) was one of the first to invest overseas. Brinson led a management buyout of the unit in 1989 and the firm was later acquired by Swiss Bank Corporation. The latter has since merged with Union Bank of Switzerland and as a result, Brinson directs over $300 billion in institutional assets, making it one of the world's largest money managers. Brinson is also co-author with Yale finance professor Roger Ibbotson of a book about asset classes, investment theory and international investing.

The Swiss banks were interested in Brinson Partners for its money management business but perhaps even more for its ability to bring North American investment techniques to Europe and elsewhere in its network. Features that are taken for granted in the United States like performance measurement, incentive compen sation, quantitative tools and hedging are less familiar in Europe (see Performance Measurement, Quantitative Investing and Risk Management). At first, the relationships were rather loose with interns coming to the Chicago headquarters for training and management coordination with the Swiss management largely by encrypted videoconferencing. More recently, the risk management and tighter controls at headquarters have dictated closer ties.

Brinson has promoted the professionalism of investment management by taking an active part in its industry association, the Association of Investment Management & Research (AIMR) and its Research Foundation. He is an advocate of small, steady incremental gains in improvement of standards. Similarly, he is an advocate for small changes in asset allocation. Consistent with the Swiss style of investing, major swings are generally unlikely to take place.

Brinson argues strongly that investment decisions should focus first and foremost on markets or asset classes since that explains roughly 90% of returns. The key is to consider overall portfolio risk rather than the risk of individual assets: a sound asset allocation combines diverse asset classes in ways that increase returns without an equal increase in risk or reduce risk without sacrificing returns.

His global asset allocation strategy rests on four basic principles:

• Think global.
• The value of asset classes should not rise and fall together.
• Focus on the long term.
• Monitor and adjust allocations to accommodate changed investment climates.

Brinson believes that in a relatively short time, it will seem as odd to most investors to discuss a Europe fund's country allocations as it does now to discuss a US fund's relative exposure to each of the fifty states. In his mind, country concerns will be minimal in comparison with company concerns.

What is Global Investing?

Don't put all your eggs in one basket, the principle of portfolio diversification, is widely accepted by investors. It is normally thought of in terms of the number of assets, industries or companies across which an investor is spread: a well-diversified portfolio contains equities (as well as bonds, cash, etc.) in industries whose returns do not move together. And the lower the correlation between the returns on the various equities or other assets, the less wildly the value of the whole portfolio should swing.
Less frequently is diversification considered in relation to owning equities and other assets from different countries. But with many national markets often highly uncorrelated, this form of diversification would seem to offer the strongest potential for reducing risk, while at the same time promising enhanced returns. Particularly for investors in one of the highly valued markets of the developed world, buying foreign equities uncorrelated with their domestic market should, in principle, make their overall equity portfolios less risky and more valuable.

So global investing is in the first instance about asset allocation between equities, bonds, cash and other instruments; and second, about investing in global markets. Asset allocators benefit by diversifying across asset classes; international investors benefit by diversifying their portfolio across assets in a range of different countries. The key factor for the latter is the degree of integration of the real economies of the countries concerned. It is important to understand co-movements among different markets: the more markets move together, the fewer the benefits of international diversification.

Global data for 1998 reveals significant performance differentials between regions. The MSCI World Index rose 19.7% but only two regions Europe at 26.5% and North America at 27.1% ex ceeded that. Across the emerging markets, performance ranged from a spectacular 137.5% gain in South Korea to an 83.2% decline for Russia (see Emerging Markets). Though somewhat narrower, differences in the developed world are just as striking: Finland gained 119.1% while Norway declined 31.2%. This large regional performance differential underscores the importance of a global portfolio strategy. An asset allocation strategy that on average correctly anticipated these differences would have added significant value.

Global investment provides a security hedge and a currency hedge. Frequently, investors do not separate the two (see Foreign Exchange). Nearly all academic studies suggest that the question of currency hedging should be dealt with explicitly and should not be treated as incorporated automatically within the overall global allocation. And it is important to recognize that currency hedging may be costly and can increase risk. The Asian meltdown in 1998, for example, led to the double whammy of currency devaluation and stock market collapse.

Richard Olsen’s Reactions on Critics (Part 2)

Currency attacks are becoming a depressingly common feature of the global economy. But the exact timing of the onset of an attack is notoriously difficult to predict. Richard Olsen has developed a global financial early-warning system, which tries to do the same thing as a gadget that tells someone when they are getting their next heart attack.

Olsen comments:
We have been looking at the data now for many years and we have learned a lot about what really makes a market function successfully. And, most importantly, how the components within the market that is, the market makers, the medium and long-term investors interact, and what is required to build a healthy market or, in reverse, what leads to a negative market with large-scale shocks.
For obvious reasons, such a system would be of immense interest to regulators and speculators.
The core determining factor of a currency's value is the health of the real national economy, especially the balance-of-payments. current account. If there is a surplus in the current account, that is, a country sells more goods than it buys, then buyers have to acquire that currency to purchase goods. This adds to foreign reserves and bids up the price of that currency. Conversely, a current account deficit implies the need to sell the local currency in order to acquire foreign goods. Persistent current account deficits, particularly if allied with relatively low foreign reserves, indicate a problem.

A currency's value is also affected by levels of inflation and the domestic rate of interest. High rates of interest and low inflation make a currency attractive for those holding assets denominated in it. So typically one country raising interest rates while others remain the same will raise the value of its currency as money flows into the country. This will have a limited effect if the fundamentals are wrong.

Comparative inflation rates, interest rates and balances of payments will all give clues to likely medium-term movements of a currency. But a key factor determining short-term currency values is market sentiment. There can be a self-fueling process in which enthusiasm for a currency, or the lack of it, drives the exchange rate. Speculators might decide, as they did during the European Monetary System debacle of 19923 and the Asian and Russian crises of 19978, that a currency is overvalued or simply that there are speculative gains to be made by selling it.

Currency attacks are triggered when a small shock to the fundamentals of the economy is combined with systemic weaknesses in the corporate and banking sectors. One facet of such systemic weaknesses is the effect of belated hedging activity by some economic actors in the economy whose currency is under attack. The more these actors try to hedge, the greater is the incentive for others to follow suit. This unleashes a whiplash effect, which turns a potentially orderly depreciation into a collapse of the currency. In other words, if speculators believe a currency will come under attack, their actions will precipitate the crisis; while if they believe the currency is not in danger, their inaction will spare it from attack attacks are self-fulfilling. The magnitude of the shock necessary to trigger an attack need not be large, which makes predictions very difficult. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions on the vulnerability of currencies to attack. In particular, there must be a pre-existing weakness, which will prevent the authorities from conducting a fullfledged defense of the currency by raising interest rates. The weakness may not be lethal in itself (though it can become lethal once the situation deteriorates) so it is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for a speculative attack.

Self-fulfilling attacks may affect any country with a fixed exchange rate and high capital mobility that is in the gray area between fully safe and sure to be attacked. Recent research suggests that countries with strong trade links with a country that has recently experienced a currency crisis is highly likely to face an attack itself the growing phenomenon of contagion in foreign exchange markets.

Richard Olsen’s Reactions on Critics

Why have we focused on studying the forex markets? Researching these markets is like doing research in a nuclear reactor, where basic processes can be studied in states of high energy. In such an environment it is easier to identify the forces that drive financial markets and distinguish them from random market effects.

People fail to realize the importance of forex markets to support the globalization of the "investment business." Relative to trade flows, investments across borders have increased much more dramatically. The forex markets have to be able to accommodate the demands of these international investors, who want to sell their foreign holdings at a moment's notice. Even though the forex markets have grown, the growth has been insufficient to support the requirements of an international investment community.

The introduction of electronic transaction systems has speeded up transactions in forex dramatically during the past six years. There is a side effect that has been neglected by many of the commentators. Similar to the money multiplier, there is a market liquidity multiplier. If the efficiency of the transaction system increases, then transactions are settled much more quickly. This has the effect that liquidity dries up much more rapidly than in the past.

My inference is that today's forex markets are far too small to support our globalized financial community. The effect will be erratic price movements, as we saw on 7 October 1998 with the 20% shift in the dollaryen exchange rate.

The introduction of the euro will make things worse. I think that we have to look at the euro as a merger of the European countries. Europe will thus become like one big football stadium with a strong US counterpart. The world will thus have two big football stadia. The stadia need wide roads, that is, highly liquid forex markets. Unfortunately, the new dollar euro exchange rate will not be sufficiently liquid to absorb the large shifts of capital that will occur between the dollar and the euro.

Professor Amartya Sen, who received the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, explained in great detail that starvation is not a problem of a lack of food, but deficiencies in the distribution system. We face a similar situation with the financial markets, where the fundamental economy is in satisfactory shape, but the allocation system, that is, the financial markets and in particular the forex markets and the balance sheets of the banks, are in deep trouble.

Critics on Richard Olsen

Smart as it is, there are times when the approach of Olsen and his colleagues has failed to work. Like other more simple data mining and historically based methods, it works in periods when currency movements are following a trend but gets whipsawed with penaliz-ing transaction costs in trendless markets. And during a change in the trend, O&A might identify a turn but not know the difference between a minor and a major turn.

Yet this group comes closer to modeling how the foreign exchange world really works than others. When there are new academic insights, they are likely to note them early.

A broader social counterpoint to today's forex markets is that with this daily volume of electronic, invisible money flowing throughout the world, a single nimble trader can drive a monetary institution to the wall. A trader is often compensated by a share of the trading profit, which can put tens of millions into his or her pocket. The trading institution takes the risk and the trader takes the profit: a true asymmetrical payoff scheme operates to pyramid risks. A central bank seeking to dampen its currency swings may come forward with a few billion but this is typically something that a single trader could command. In these circumstances, a central bank attempting to influence a currency is like sending a bicycle onto a superhighway.

The size of forex trade has played its part in the series of currency crises in emerging nations during the 1990s. The capacity for massive daily foreign currency flows to take place made possible the almost overnight collapses of the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia and Russia in 1997-8. As confidence in the economies of these countries fell away, demand for their currencies dried up as investors took their capital out or stopped bringing it in. Governments had tried to buy their own currencies to underpin their value but could not keep up with the sellers. When they stopped their own forex activity, the forces of demand and supply saw the baht, rupiah and ruble in turn crash in value, deepening the crisis of confidence and economic slowdown.

Some commentators are now recommending a tax on forex dealings: for example, Nobel Laureate James Tobin has warned that free capital markets with flexible exchange rates encourage short-term speculation that can have a ''devastating impact on specific industries and whole economies." To avoid this real economic havoc, he advocates a 0.5% tax on all foreign exchange transactions in order to deter speculators, a remedy dubbed the Tobin tax.

There are three rationales for the proposed Tobin tax: the first is that the volume of foreign exchange transactions is excessive fifty to a hundred times greater than that required to finance international trade; the second is related to the first reducing volatility offers more independence to national economic policy-makers; and the third is simply the tax-raising abilities of such a tax, which is linked with the view that the financial sector is relatively undertaxed.

Foreign exchange guru: Richard Olsen

In the pre-radio and telephony days, information about markets moved by post, horses and even by carrier pigeons. Investors with information in one market would send their instructions to other markets and success was often an outcome of the speed of transferring the messages.

Today's global environment also puts a premium on speed, but it is not measured in days or hours but nanoseconds. Currency-trading departments are decentralized so that individuals, usually young, nimble and quick, can make massive decisions on their own. The trading rooms of major institutions trading currencies for their own accounts often contain no one over the age of 35, none with bonus possibilities less than multiple millions and all eager to take risks to achieve personal gain.

It is perhaps not surprising that currency markets trading in hundreds of billion dollars a day, open 24 hours and with information moving so fast that there is always the chance of an information advantage, would attract speculative attention. And not surprising either that the value of speed and ability to grasp all the markets' information at once would attract academics building new models. One of these, and one of the best, is Richard Olsen of Olsen and Associates (O&A), a high-frequency data processing firm in Zurich in which Dean LeBaron has personally invested.

A visit to O&A, in a refurbished flour mill alongside Zurichsee is like a visit to Silicon Valley. Attire is California casual, tee shirts and jeans, though Olsen does wear a tie to see clients. Dogs and bikes sit outside offices while their owners are huddled over computer keyboards. Conversation is usually in English though it is hardly the first language for the majority. Academic disciplines are mathematics, economics or almost anything else. The common characteristic of the people is smart, very smart.

Olsen and his colleagues are the best at acquiring and analyzing high-frequency data, using very advanced mathematical techniques to forecast currency movements. By high frequency, they mean second by second, and forecasting might be for an hour or so ahead, perhaps even a week if long-term the value of high-frequency forecasts decay rapidly as the information that produced it is disseminated.