Is it possible to outperform the market? This is one of the most important questions any investor should ask. If your answer is no, if you believe the market is efficient, then passive investing or indexing buying diversified portfolios of all the securities in an asset class is probably the way to go. The arguments for such an approach include reduced costs, tax efficiency and the fact that, historically, passive funds have outperformed the majority of active funds ).
But if your answer is yes, it is possible to beat the market, then you should pursue active portfolio management. Among the arguments for this approach are the possibility that there are a variety of anomalies in securities markets that can be exploited to outperform passive investments, the likelihood that some companies can be pressured by investors to improve their performance , and the fact that many investors and managers have outperformed passive investing for long periods of time.
But the active investor must still face the challenge of outperforming a passive strategy. Essentially, there are two sets of decisions. The first is asset allocation, where you carve up your portfolio into different proportions of equities, bonds and other instruments. These decisions, often referred to as market timing as investors try to reallocate between equities and bonds in response to their expectations of better relative returns in the two markets, tend to require macro forecasts of broad-based market movements. Then there is security selection picking particular stocks or bonds. These decisions require micro forecasts of individual securities underpriced by the market and hence offering the opportunity for better than average returns.
Active investing involves being overweight in securities and sectors that you believe to be undervalued and underweight in assets you believe to be overvalued. Buying a stock, for example, is effectively an active investment that can be measured against the performance of the overall market. Compared with passive investing in a stock index, buying an individual stock combines an asset allocation to stocks and an active investment in that stock in the belief that it will outperform the stock index.
In both market timing and security selection decisions, investors may use either technical or fundamental analysis (. And you can be right in your asset allocation and wrong in your active security selection and vice versa. It is still possible that an investor who makes a mistake in asset allocation, perhaps by being light in equities in a bull market, can still do well by picking a few great stocks.
There are arguments for both active and passive investing though it is probably the case that a larger percentage of institutional investors invest passively than do individual investors. Of course, the active versus passive decision does not have to be a strictly either/or choice. One common investment strategy is to invest passively in markets you consider to be efficient and actively in markets you consider less efficient. Investors can also combine the two by investing part of a portfolio passively and another part actively.
Monday, September 28, 2009
The right venue, the right style
It is an old adage of investment cynics that "managers do not pick markets, markets pick managers." This attitude suggests that brilliance is about evenly distributed, but that markets select their own heroes rather than vice versa.
With the construction of investment styles according to the radiation approaches I have described, that limitation is not quite true. Rather, managers can freely roam the world looking for an investment style that suits them a growth manager could have a period of successful investing in the United States, become a non-US manager, and then find a suitable venue in emerging markets: three investment lives all engaged in approximately the same principle. One can invest in all traditional ways and change location, or one can change investment techniques and invest in the same location.
How did you know a growth company in the 1945 and later period? I knew it when I saw it. When I see it again, now, in an emerging market, I say, "this company can compete on a world-wide basis, regardless of the fact that it is ... wherever."
The US style is now flexible, fast and fuzzy. The developed (ex-US) market style is structured, systematic and suited to individual customization. And despite the global economic crisis, emerging markets are the places where there is the greatest potential for growth if we hark back to the high-quality investment styles of yore.
Market students must look geographically outwards to see familiar, repeated patterns and inwards to see what is next.
With the construction of investment styles according to the radiation approaches I have described, that limitation is not quite true. Rather, managers can freely roam the world looking for an investment style that suits them a growth manager could have a period of successful investing in the United States, become a non-US manager, and then find a suitable venue in emerging markets: three investment lives all engaged in approximately the same principle. One can invest in all traditional ways and change location, or one can change investment techniques and invest in the same location.
How did you know a growth company in the 1945 and later period? I knew it when I saw it. When I see it again, now, in an emerging market, I say, "this company can compete on a world-wide basis, regardless of the fact that it is ... wherever."
The US style is now flexible, fast and fuzzy. The developed (ex-US) market style is structured, systematic and suited to individual customization. And despite the global economic crisis, emerging markets are the places where there is the greatest potential for growth if we hark back to the high-quality investment styles of yore.
Market students must look geographically outwards to see familiar, repeated patterns and inwards to see what is next.
Investing in US in 1970-1990
The post-World War II era and its corollary in other markets of the world ended after a generation, almost simultaneously, with academic studies on efficient markets achieving prominence in the United States. Firms capitalized on this phase shift by introducing index products and popularizing valuation shifts and new valuation techniques that are all price-related. As the dictum shifted to "buy low, sell high," it was characterized by the emergence of new investment folk heroes like Warren Buffett. A few firms, Batterymarch among them, popularized valuation techniques for institutional investors, giving voice to this newly emerged market style in the United States.
In Europe and Asia, internationally dominant companies, which looked very much like the nifty fifty, appeared popular for investing. Siemens, Hitachi, Sony, Philips, Bayer and their counterparts became components of more venturesome US institutional portfolios and appeared as the first equity holdings of some of the more fixed-income-oriented institutional holdings outside the United States.
And exactly the same pattern seen in the United States during 194570 was repeated, except in different places, in different markets.
Development institutions then shifted their attention from the devastated areas of World War II to the poorer countries suffering from population explosion. In many cases, these were agrarian-based economies with little ability to soften the shocks and cycles inherent in farming. These markets that had previously been worrying about subsistence began to establish the basis for market economies. Largely influenced by government programs, some of these countries began developing market structures.
In Europe and Asia, internationally dominant companies, which looked very much like the nifty fifty, appeared popular for investing. Siemens, Hitachi, Sony, Philips, Bayer and their counterparts became components of more venturesome US institutional portfolios and appeared as the first equity holdings of some of the more fixed-income-oriented institutional holdings outside the United States.
And exactly the same pattern seen in the United States during 194570 was repeated, except in different places, in different markets.
Development institutions then shifted their attention from the devastated areas of World War II to the poorer countries suffering from population explosion. In many cases, these were agrarian-based economies with little ability to soften the shocks and cycles inherent in farming. These markets that had previously been worrying about subsistence began to establish the basis for market economies. Largely influenced by government programs, some of these countries began developing market structures.
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